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**Abstract** In my article I criticize the conception which says that the conceptual character of human cognition makes false the theory of truth understood as a kind of correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker. Arguing against the conceptions of Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Andrzej Szahaj, I defend the claim that the conceptual character of human cognition is irrelevant to the critique of correspondence theories of truth. I justify this claim with the example of Nicholas Rescher's conception of conceptual idealism, which is similar to the internal realism of Hilary Putnam but does not rule out the truth as a kind of correspondence.