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Verbum interius

It is the undeniable fact that something important happened to philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. The majority of philosophers espoused the idea that no fact can be undeniable, because all of them are “radically contingent.”

Happily enough though, they immortalized the birth (no more consequently to be thought of as merely contingent) of their anti-factual theories so that the fact in question (“something happened”) can be surveyed notwithstanding the fleeting and evanescent character of its very kin-mates.

As, however, to many people the very idea of the “contingent reality” (or even the idea of the “frailty of human existence”) might appear familiar, it is worth recollecting that it had not been so until Scotus in the 14th century proved (or at least believed so) it to be.¹

To stand in such a distance to the “reality” implied a certain dualism: a distinction between *vérités de raison* and *vérités de fait* (Leibniz); resp. *relations of ideas* and *matters of facts* (Hume). The facts (*existentia*) should be “contingent.” Contemporarily, the opposite pole of the contingent is deemed either *ideation* (Husserl) or *implicit definitions* (Schlick). But the alluring force of the dualism lies in the idea of the parallelism of those two realms: the *ideatum* is in an accord with the real,² which is to be meant of the concepts that are supposed to be “adequate.”³

¹ The contingent individuals are the real occasion for our cognition only (*Lectura*, I d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, 207: *Ordinatio*, I d. 3, p. 1, q. 4 [8] 323. According to Honnefelder, Scotus elaborated on the original philosophy of the contingent-existent (L. Honnefelder, *Ens in quantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Münster 1989, p. 253). Facts are contingent in: L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, 4. 27; 5. 634.

² M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Part 1, Ch. 6, § 44.

³ E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Prolegomena zur reiner Logik*, Part 1, Ch. 8, § 51, Ch. 11, § 68. V, *Idee zur Reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch*, Part 4, Ch. 2, § 142. 21,

In fact, there was no better means to escape from the “fragile reality” than to live in this “conceptual” world. We can feel safely barred from the former by “referring the fact that was referred by someone who related ...”—without putting a definite full stop behind an ultimate “naked fact.” Something “perfectly factual” is but an oxymoron. Still, the most legitimate inhabitants of the “conceptual world” seem to be scientists, because the science : “is the system of exact concepts that our knowledge correlates to all reality ... the *entire world* is in principle open to designation by that conceptual system.”⁴ As has been said, no definite outcome is to be expected of this system.⁵

However, there is no reason to believe in science, as the founders of Rationalism did. Quite the opposite: it is the scientists who believe in “reality:”

...there is no reason to suppose that this system must fail in regard to the given world of qualities known by acquaintance. On the contrary, we believe that it is possible to apply it universally so long as there is no rigorous proof that we err in believing.⁶

A real believer is at the same time a medium between the “consciousness” and the “reality.” E.g., a Freudian delivers a hidden reality and clothes it with “proper” words so as to master the “reality.” The difference to the Socratic *ματευσις* is apparent: there is something between us (*μεταξύ*): some happen to be the “relatives,” because the true parallelism is to be expected between him who engenders science and him who accepts it. And the realm between us becomes something spiritual and peremptorily existent.

It is rather obvious why the “conceptual” world is doomed to a precarious existence in the minds of specialists. Apart from being what they are, concepts are actually spoken of, and this is but factual.⁷ The only hope was to reach to those “immune,” intangible” ones; to the “mirror of eternity,” which was however eventually proclaimed impossible for the inhabitants of the *Lebenswelt* (Husserl).

Protocol sentences were held by the logical positivists to be the most elementary statements about empirical facts.

The validity of this assumption has been criticized. Neat as it appears, it does not seem to meet basic requirements for human understanding. The attack came from the part of the Philosophy of Subject and the language was heralded as the “human” in question. This was an indispensable medium without which no sentence (including those pretending to be basic) were possible. The reason seems to be well founded. Indeed, for a scientist to pass such a statement the rudimentary use of language is indispensable. But not only this. There is a scientific language too; and it seems to be justifiable to ask about its beginning as well.

M. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, Part 1, Ch. 5B, § 36; Part 2, Ch.3, § 63; Part 2, Ch. 1, § 47; M. Schlick, *General Theory of Knowledge*, trans. from germ. by A. E. Blumberg, New York 1974, p. 301.

⁴ M. Schlick, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 363, 321.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 326.

⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 47, 161.

As known, according to Aristotle, the mind's conception (and the word consequently, too) is formed by a process called "abstraction." There are but few ideas so vehemently attacked nowadays as this one: Aristotle implied that real things are seen in the world, and not the "reality" first.⁸ Now, according to Mach and Wittgenstein we have to put up with a substitute: a bundle of impressions fitting for setting up a self-coherent set of concepts. The apparent drawback of such an approach had been pointed out neatly (although not, to be sure, as a drawback, but rather as a certain restriction of mind's capacity) by Kant. There was nothing in our experience save what was composed of the concepts possessed a priori. Moritz Schlick put it this way: all the cognition was re-cognition of what had been previously known.⁹

Consequently, no advance into completely unknown is possible. Some rudimentary knowledge lies at bottom, and determines all the progress. Apparently, the problem of—let us use the coined term—Humanization emerges. Something makes man different to beasts, and if asked about, the only reason to be given seems to be that men, contrary to beasts, possess language. Still, the way humans acquired that mysterious quality is burrowed deep in the darkness of history. If pressed, one can even resort to the "pre-history," and the answer is a perfect one, because it cannot be checked at all.

Let us thus, to the contrary, try to embark on the way for a solution from a different vantage-point. True, the subject to analyze does not seem sophisticated enough. The problem can be formulated simply thus: if children are not born along with language, whence does the latter come from? Apparently, they do not become humans *as soon as they learn a language*, but they prove to be humans *in a certain time*, because they can learn it. The problem faced is: how to account for the process of the appropriation of the language? Does this process belong to the humanity in virtue of its *outcome*, or, rather, is it a kind of ontogenesis in virtue of its *outset*? As the problem of the co-called Humanization has not been ever appropriately answered, Hegelian approach—the human history from the point of view of the Absolute Spirit seems to be the only self-coherent one (if uncanny though). The problem is by no means an academic one: one at least of its ramifications is to be distinctly seen nowadays.

The problem in question is how to teach and learn language most effectively. Shocking as it might appear, two-years old toddlers are expected to learn so. Apparently, by the mere fact of becoming adult children lose something important for learning effectively. In fact, Schlick maintained the contrary: the re-cognizing of something as already known is only of advantage for us. Still, children along with the acquisition of a knowledge seem to lose the susceptibility to learn another one. According to Schilck's principles, the cognizance of something anew is possible

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 244.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

only in light of what was previously known, whereas to the contrary, it appears to be practically almost impossible (a child as soon as possessed of the knowledge of the proper language loses all its interest in learning further). In fact, it becomes almost “saturated” with one kind of knowledge to the detriment of the other. Consequently, it has been believed that if the process of the assimilation of one’s language be anticipated early enough, the acquisition of another will be possible.

The idea is preposterous enough, because it is not time that matters, but a special attitude of a person that accounts for the promptness of how he or she adopts a language. Such an attitude exists in children, but apparently is stifled in the course of the education. True, for a short term, this attitude can be successfully discounted; but the very nature can only suffer thus. This human nature accounts for the possibility of learning at all. Plato depicted a shocking image of the slaves burdened with the yoke of the verbiage imposed on them by some masters of speaking. The human bondage, the most shameful one, is procured by the verbiage. Wilhelm von Humboldt rightly observed that the language is the best means to manipulate people. The human yoke of verbal bondage must be imposed on the shoulders of the modern thralls-to-be as early as only possible. Thus we can see a deep difference between the learning of a language for the sake of broadening one’s outlook, and learning for the sake of accepting a yoke of a social hackneyed activity.

Provided we have in mind the real good of a person, the proper attitude to learning language is a “resuscitation” of this “naïve” perspective prematurely trampled in a child. There is a certain advantage of child’s seeing the outer world. Does it see intuitively; directly? There is no evidence thereof. Were it the case, what would account for the using of concepts which are by nature foreign to every intuition? Apparently, some transparent “ideas” are formed in a child’s mind naturally, and the very process seems to be inborn. This is why some concepts are neat and some mushy: it is because of the proximity to those transparent “ideas” or “concepts.”

We can see the outside world by a window. Probably the glass is of a certain advantage thereto, similarly as lenses for a short-sighted. A strong wind and a searing sun irritates easily our eyes. However, the glass must be as transparent as only possible. We cannot see properly if it is filthy. It is similarly with language. We can see real things naming them at the same time. The older we are, the more automatically we attribute certain collocations to a given word. The more obtrusive the language is, the more distorted the image of a thing. However, it is up to us to annihilate the blight of human verbiage, and the very automatic in us (Skinner) is to be freely mastered. Plato believed that Socrates could shake off the yoke of sophisms, still, he was mercilessly disabused of his illusions as to the real state of affairs: the fate of the father of the Western Philosophy and Ethics. The word of “father” seems to be quite appropriate here: if a thought is to be “conceived”

in our mind, it is because of a certain personal relation towards one who is by nature the nearest to us.

A scientist and child share something in common. If there is something really new to be learned, it is only a child or scientist who can renounce the supposedly obvious for the sake of the unknown. The beginning of the Greek philosophy is marked precisely by this attitude. The attitude of admiration, of asking “why it is so.” The answer springs the narrow boundaries of preconceived ideas, because to become cognizant of something really new, a new language must be formed; the collocations used by Aristotle in his “Metaphysics” are extremely stretched: the language appears to be save a means to express our thought more or less adequately.

Some people are complacent with how they see the world; even if they see it through a filthy glass. But a child and scientist see the outer world behind the words; and a philosopher’s attitude is but more radical. By nature, humans seek for the world behind words, for the outer world, for the transcendent. Aristotle likened a philosopher to the mythical Linkeus, who was able to see through walls.¹⁰ There is “the same way up and down” Heraclitus wrote.¹¹ There is a distant call scarcely perceptible. It is in the voice of our parents that we learn to distinguish it first. But the very idea of the fatherhood is as deep as the deepest yearning of human will.

Now as to the whole heaven or order of the universe—for whatsoever name is most acceptable to it, be it so named by us—we must first ask concerning it the question which lies at the outset of every inquiry, whether did it exist eternally, having no beginning of generation, or has it come to into being, starting from some beginning? It has come into being: for it can be seen and felt and has body; and all such things are sensible, and sensible things, apprehensible by opinion with sensation, belong, as we saw, to becoming and creation. We say that what has come to be must be brought into being by some cause. Now the maker and father of this All it were a hard task to find, and having found him, it were impossible to declare him to all men.¹²

The acclaimed frailty of human existence is perceptible save along with its final destiny likened to this of “gods:” the latter are anthropomorphized because the former are capable of divinity:

Gods of gods, whose creator am I and father of works, which by me coming into being are indissoluble save by my will: Behold, all which hath been fastened may be loosed, yet to loose that which is well fitted and in good case were the will of an evil one. Wherefore, forasmuch as ye have come into being, immortal ye are not, nor indissoluble altogether; nevertheless shall ye not be loosed nor meet with the doom of death, having found in my will a bond yet mightier and more sovereign than

¹⁰ Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, frg. 105.

¹¹ S. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, Ch.1: “Yet, because man’s perfect good is that he somehow know God, lest such a noble creature might seem to be created to no purpose, as being unable to reach its own end, there is given to man a certain way through which he can rise to the knowledge of God: so that, since the perfections of things descend in a certain order from the highest summit of things—God—man may progress in the knowledge of God by beginning with lower things and gradually ascending. Now, even in bodily movements, the way of descending is the same as the way of ascending, distinguished by beginning and end.” (Translated by Charles J. O’Neil.)

¹² Plato, *Timaeus*, Ch. III, 28C (trans. R.D. Archer, M.A., London–New York 1888).

those that ye were bound withal when ye came into being. Now therefore hearken to the word that I declare unto you ...¹³

The beginning of the Western Philosophy and of the Western Science, too, is marked by the birth of this tension towards the ultimate. The driving force of the Civilization is precisely what animates the human existence from its beginning. Greeks made this tension both perceptible and estimable most of all.

The nature lives by its own forces. The human nature, its disinterested seeking for truth were occasionally given freedom to develop. But, to the contrary, the history of human kind is marked by the appearance of parasites, too. There are some only too happy to harness this genuine driving force of human nature to their petty businesses. In the lapse of time, the hidden, driving force of the Western Civilization was being successively disregarded, despised, even mocked. Living on his victim, the parasite is unwilling to admit that it is the case. Eventually, the death of the victim puts an end to his existence, too; but he tries to postpone the inevitable and to enchant the “reality” by denying everything that does not suit his purpose.

As commonly assumed, a sustainable growth is one safely based on the nature. Thus, however, we define the growth in question, the notion of the nature being not cleared. In fact, it is something supposed to be obvious or even taken for granted. What is, then, the notion of nature we are so complacent with?

We may accept that the growth in question is some ramification of the general process of the Universe, called the evolution. In other words, it would be a special “human” evolution. The notion of time seems to be intrinsically included there. The question, in turn, about the nature of time seems to be specifically philosophical one. According to Hegel and Heidegger, the Temporality is strictly connected with the human Consciousness. There would be no time without someone able to count the progress of the Universe. The present state of the Universe aged at 14 billion years would not be accounted for, were it not for the human Consciousness that crowns that evolution. We may suppose then that the “history” of the Universe is but a anthropomorphic way to look at the Past. Traditionally, before Kant and Hegel, people assumed that the becoming of the Universe was counted in quite particular way; it was not time, but an order of Reason governing the becoming and perishing of the species.

What is, then, the nature of the natural tension that makes it possible, for the human Civilization to grow? The concept that the growth has merely to adjust its steps to the universal pace of the Cosmic development seems to be naïve.

Nature gives a safe basis for all the human enterprises. How should we, then, mark our proceedings according to the throbbing of the heart of the nature? At what pace does it throb? Is that pace marked merely by time?

¹³ *Ibidem*, Ch. VI, 41AB.

According to Aristotle, the time is the numbering of the motion. The notion of numbering, however, had been connected by Kant with the notion of Mathematics. Consequently, we “number” the nature by dint of Mathematics, and we are able to pass the gap between the Present and the Future by dint of the experiment, the most general frames of which are given by Mathematics.

Aristotle was not unaware of the importance of Mathematical Natural History. There is, still, a science that envisages a more eminent aspect of the Universe. It “counts” this some other way. It is Aristotelian Physics. The growth of the human Civilization is only possible if the natural Order of the Universe be preserved. There is, moreover, an Author of this Order, the Transcendent Principle of the Whole. It is essential that all the human endeavours be in accordance with the general tendency of the Universe towards its ultimate Form, and the Giver of that Form. The growth in question is, consequently only possible when based on that general tendency of the Universe towards its Order and its Cause.

Man participates, to be sure, in the temporality as an animal; but he participates too in the cognition of the aforesaid Order, and, what is even more important, in placing his desires in the Transcendent Principle of the Universe.

All the human endeavours which are not in accordance with this tension towards the Transcendent are, which is rather obvious, poised in the air, as it were. But there is another aspect of the problem yet. As long as they manage to endure for some time, at least, they parasitize on the natural tension of man towards the Transcendent. The nature enables man to order his life according to the order of Nature and its Author. The intellect enables man to see “beyond.” In other words, the ethical and intellectual aspirations of man must not be quenched for the sake of the better future in which the authenticity of a man is gauged by the force of his imagination, and strong emotions justify whatsoever at all.

Man naturally desires the absolute truth and absolute good. Unless some at least believe that good and truth as such exist, it is impossible to bring forth anything that bears a resemblance to the good and truth. It happens that the progress ensues along the path marked with some Schlagworts of lesser or bigger importance. They are, however, ever the words. The essence lies hidden, because it is impossible after departing from phenomenon to reach the “hidden side.” Husserl proclaimed the “return to the things” by dint of the so-called “eidetic reduction.” The problem is, still, that we cannot “return,” if you like, save to that which is preconceived beforehand. The *eidon* is but the *eidon* of the phenomenon. The true “reduction” must consist in reaching the *eidon* which is first encountered by *totally different expressions*, which is tantamount to that it must go beyond the language; it must create a quite new kind of philosophical language. The proper to it is that it depart from common day expressions and reach the point where a tongue is created anew. In other words: the Transcendent can be called by many names, probably because it is yearned by so many different hearts, which does not amount of course to that it can be called quite whimsically. It shall be called according to the rational nature of man.

Consequently, we have to do with two kinds of the “world.” Firstly, we can speak of the world as ordered intellectually, and intellectually cognizable. Secondly, we can speak of the “apparent” world, the world that closes itself before the Transcendent, a “tame” world; the world kind and friendly; the world in which all the license is safe from being castigated, or put aright from “beyond.” That human fabric of the world is precisely described by Heidegger in the first pages of “Being and Time.” The “Weltlichkeit” lives on the repeated smothering of the natural desire of man. There we have the world of mere appearances with no place for absolute justice (moderation of the current events from beyond), no absolute truth (but utility only); no speculative philosophy.

Are phenomena appearances of anything? Are any things prerequisite for the development of the aforesaid world? What is the hidden essence, if any, that supports the fabric of this world? Not many, understandable enough, are willing to admit that there is any. The modern slavery consists in harnessing everything gentle, subtle, honest, genuinely good in man to the preposterous chariot of the Progress.

The most blatant example of the aforesaid is this: there is a certain allurements connected with the human body, and there is mirth to be found in the family life. But there is an advantage to be taken thereof. There is the nature and a parasite here. There is the human procreation connected with the tranquility of order and the hope for peace; the fidelity of the espoused; and the safety of the children. But they must be protected lest some weak spot be found in the family life. To the contrary, the co-called “sex” has been invented allegedly for the sake of human happiness, whereas, in fact, it serves the “sex-business.”

There is no such thing as “sex” to be found in beasts. It would be an unreasonable waste of energy to consecrate themselves not to the continuation of species, but to mere pleasure. The pleasure is for the sake of life, and not conversely. Is man any different? In some sense he is. The specific difference of man is rationality. We are humans as far as we act according to reason. There is no morals without reason. What, then, the aforesaid difference consists in? The animal instinct instigates to the propagation of the species, to the upbringing of the progenies. Now, the human begetting is this and more: the reason adds something essential, but by no means destroys the animal in man: in cannot be a sophisticated factor of the blind lust. There is no such lust to be found in beasts: they act economically. Consequently, we must say that the human procreation consists chiefly in the propagation of the body and in the propagation of the order of reason, too. The upbringing of children consists in begetting their wisdom, spiritual strength and morals. That is what the integrity of the human nature consists in. But, in half way to accomplish its end the family founds a waylaid parasite. There are means to accomplish our aims. One of them is connected with the physical proximity of a man and woman. This proximity must not be encroached into.

We need the others to be helped, we need some to be as high as possible, sometimes. For the sake of human liberty an individual has a full right to demand

that his proximity to the person trusted and loved be as close as only possible. The physical proximity between a man and woman is but an example, the most evident though. However, the beginning of the life, similarly as its end became something banal. Man is reduced to mere physiology. There is no room left for the mystery of life. In fact, it sounds even a bit ridiculous. There is no demand in the market for the mystery, there is no place for it in the „modern” science, too. But ordinary people are neither scientists nor mere consumers. They have right (a human right *par excellence*) to the unspoken or to the named but in whisper. Alas, the silence and higness cannot be sold. They are, by definition, something private.

Another one phenomenon has appeared recently: it not that much allurements as threat to be found there: unless you conform, you will be stamped with the label of an outsider, of a misfit. It is a real irony that this blackmail that hampers directly the human freedom is so easily being matched with it. There has been but one completely successful tyrant since the beginning of the civilization. Italians call it *la paura*—the fear. Quite recently, in BBC radio, Roger Scruton analyzed some forms of the sheer witch-hunt to be found in the world that boasts its modernity—all directly opposed to the freedom of speech.

The unimagined cannot be feared, and, for that matter, not even “stunning;” the intellect gives freedom; it is only because of phantasms that we happen to be “blown away.”

There is something, to be sure, in human nature that accounts for the brilliant success of the picture-culture. In fact, it is easier to “depict” than to “describe.” And the answer why it is so, has been given by Aristotle. According to scholastics: *omnis repraesentatio est delectabilis*; people are extremely prone to externalize the contents of their psyche. According to what prevails, the spoken of is either proportionate to the intelligible word conceived inside, or to the distorted and amorphous image of something irrational. The intelligible word of the innermost, it is a source of independence and freedom; the irrational, to the contrary, is susceptible of the external influence. The image of the truly beloved is marked with a unique characteristic; intimate and half-spoken. The images of the unsettled lust are boisterous, fatuous and banal. It is only too easy to discount a faintest trace of someone’s moral weakness here. For inasmuch as it is simply delectable to picture anything in one’s mind, this picturing is a remedy for uneasiness, too. Human will naturally desires a rest, but the rest is not always natural also. Apart from the natural, rational desire, a desire happens in man for something only allegedly natural. And, whereas the rational desire terminates in the intellectual word, the whimsical desire terminates, as such, in a sensual image. The intellectual contemplation of the word engenders peace. A sensual apprehension of the image brings about some precarious rest. There is some relief in uttering thoughts preying on one’s mind. Once spoken of, clad in some words, the inner inquietude seems to some easier to bear. However, one falls prey of an illusion: the sensual in man is not genuinely natural; it is because of the sensual character of the images that we

can be so easily manipulated by advertisements; it is something besides us, besides that which makes us free and independent. The representation in question is thus but a palliative, a kind of a drug that only makes addictives. For it be efficient but for a short time, it must be reiterated. Vast swathes of modern consciousness are repetitive, most obviously—the advertisements. It is evident that a drunkard can be made obedient by a sheer prospect of liquor. There are some images that function in the collective psyche in the same way. The choosers are not, as a rule, preferable to consumers. High demands are not appreciated, because the demand for a well-selling product is more important. Consumers are, generally, expected to “discover” something banal; to “be free” by acting according to what they are told. The world of a consumer is the world of twaddle.

Joseph Conrad wrote: “we live at the mercy of a malevolent word.” There are some words that dominate and enslave (Hegel, Gadamer). There are some prejudices difficult to asset; not because they are not fertile, but because they are what they are: prejudices. There are words that reverberate in our ears gruesomely; words that inspired and fascinated. The Nobel-Prize winner, Alexis Carrel wrote:

Eugenics is indispensable for the perpetuation of the strong. A great race must propagate its best elements ... Eugenics may exercise a great influence upon the destiny of the civilized races. ... The propagation of the insane and the feeble-minded ... must be prevented. ... The establishment of a hereditary biological aristocracy through voluntary eugenics would be an important step towards the solution of our present problems.¹⁴

The problems of pre-war Europe were meant. We (a century later) are not willing to admit our being able to have erred like this. From the vantage-point of “Modernity” we look down with disdain at what happened to those unenlightened. But, are we definitely immune to all errors? Now, there is but one perfect villain: the one who deems himself absolutely incapable of committing a villainy. For, as it is our destiny to wade into the deep darkness of unforeseeable future (a human “contingency”), every new idea that we stumble upon, has the alluring force of novelty. But this novelty is nothing else than our being able to do absolutely everything, including a wretchedness. The perfect villain, after committing a villainy denies the proper name to it. Being “perfect” in this way is tantamount to cleaving to one’s own preconceived ideas. That we can enchant the future is the most sinister superstition. Instead, a serious moral obligation rests on us to mould it rationally to the extent we are able to.

The assumption made by eugenics was: only the strong have the right to live. Plato was far from being a Trasimachos: he thought that we shall hark to the voice of the little child in us,¹⁵ and that this voice is the most precious one, because it reveals the very human in us. By this, that is meant which makes man differ from

¹⁴ A. Carrel, *Man, the Unknown*, 1939 by Harper & Brothers. (Ch. VII, p. 7)

¹⁵ Plato, *Phaedo*, Ch. XXIV, 77E.

animals, viz., his reason. The language is but a manifestation thereof. Aristotle makes it clear while investigating the basic experience of the natural world.

When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.

The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not ‘knowable relatively to us’ and ‘knowable’ without qualification. So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.

Now what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. ‘round,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly a child begins by calling all men ‘father,’ and all women ‘mother,’ but later on distinguishes each of them...¹⁶

In this words Aristotle surveys the beginning of human language. There lies at bottom a “confused, obscure cognition”—a purely intellectual one, but due to the feebleness of human intellect—hardly perceptible. It are children who exhibit such a readiness to absorb “naively” the naked facts they face. In an environment most proper for them they embrace the force of the intellectual fatherhood that guides and strengthens. They can feel like Platonic “gods,” not because of being allegedly sinless, but because the voice of “Father and Maker” is perceived “dimly” from a remote distance. It is the vocation that matters. It is the word that we do not dare to ignore: οὐδ’ ἄλιον αἰποῖ αἰσεται ὅττι κεν εἴπη.¹⁷ The word that happens to be heard in our plight: αἰω δ’ ἄχε’ ἄκριτα θυμῷ.¹⁸

Some are strong enough to embark on the great journey towards the ultimate. Sometimes they stop in the middle way (considering a science the ultimate end). But the nature of the beginning, if scrutinized carefully, reveals the nature of the goal. According to Aristotle, everything began with the “theologia” of ancient poets. Aristotle only willed to be precise: the uttermost science is “theologiké,” because the ultimate goal of the Universe (including man) is God—ὁ θεός.¹⁹

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Physics*, I Ch. 1 (translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye).

¹⁷ Homer, *Ilias*, XXIV, 93.

¹⁸ Verse 92.

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, Ch. 7, 1072b 13-33; Ch. 9, 1073a 38-1074b 14; I, Ch. 3, 983b 27-30.

Aristotle, however, had not exhausted all the possible meanings of the θεωρία, by which we cleave to God.

Heading towards the ultimate, one can be tempted to rest on the way: things that we stumble upon, especially when named in an enticing way, can hamper the progress. They are, according to Dionisius, “proposed” to us (προβάλλεται), and pose an obstacle at the same time. It is Order that is “divine” (not to be sure in Rahner’s sense, as it is purely physical), not the things as such. The relation is the feeblest reality possible—and it is because of this characteristic that we can embrace it without committing idolatry.

The Aristotelian “being” is not the “reality.” It is (and is known too as) manifold πολλαχοῦ λέγεται. It is the structured fabric of the Universe that we ascend heading towards the ultimate. It is the “is” of the scientific judgment that matters. Truth is endowed with its proper attracting force: there is no need (and it is downright wrong) to propose ideas as “mine.” This way they rather “distract.” It is up to anyone to recognize truth in his or her own way, not because there are “many” truths, but because, as Dionisius observed aright, we start from manifold grounds, entangled in manifold errors. The being is “manifold” because each human pitfall and misery can be judged aright, and the way out can be shown.

The beginning of Aristotelian “Physics” accounts both for the origin of knowledge and language in man. The primarily perceived is by its very nature indefinite, evanescent and of a fleeting character. As we, however, are accustomed to the notion of the nature, we can call it simply a primitive estate of nature, or—briefly—the motion in the sense of the principiatum of nature. The aforementioned fleeting character of our primitive cognizance of nature makes it clear why it is difficult to name it properly. In fact, the very notion of the motion can be ambiguous. As we face here the basis of our knowledge and language, it seems extremely difficult not to distort this primitive datum with an inappropriate tongue. It is simply impossible to define the principle by means of what stems from this principle. The only appropriate approach is a reductive analysis, which was precisely done by Aristotle in his treatise on nature.

Still, it is tempting for a philosopher to look at those primitive data from some more theoretical point of view. In the 7th book of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle claims that the primitive data of our experience are endowed with but a tiny amount of entity.²⁰ And, as the last of Aristotelian categories is the “relative,” we can assume that motion encompasses some relatives. For the same reason as that mentioned above, it seems difficult to grasp precisely the meaning of the Aristotelian τὸ πρὸς τι. It is like seizing the middle of a rope without seeing its both ends. And it is the continuum that characterizes motion intrinsically. The primarily perceived is a continuum without boundaries, because the latter are simply terms—names that we give to the naturally perceived.

²⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, Ch. 4, 1029b 8-12.

This notion of the continuum permeates, in a sense, all our experience. The world, according to Aristotle, is a whole. According to Dionisius the miraculous connection of the perfections of being is most important characteristic of the Universe. The structured unity of the world is “dense;” there are no gaps between species. The evolution is not diachronic, it is a simultaneous existence of all possible degrees of being in the Universe. Similarly, from the amorphous data of the experience some boundaries, terms, intellectual concepts evolve. The world, might have had the history of her reaching the estate of perfection; and our knowledge, emerges from something evolving in our senses, too. Still, the evolved is marked by strict boundaries, by neat terms and by the precise language (if there is a “language” of the Universe, also). What emerges in the end is the structured fabric of the Universe; the structure with lineaments easy to grasp.

There is no inborn knowledge in man, but there is inborn idea (and Plato was right there) of the order. Chaos is something abhorrent, loathsome to man. The order, if grasped intellectually, engenders peace. The progress of man is marked by seizing manifold aspects of the order of the Universe. The order as a transcendental Idea (Kant) is self-contradictory. It is the most palpable, the most connatural to man; it is impossible to live (actually) in the realm bereft of order. True, it “regulates” the human understanding, but it does so to the extent we immerse into the naturally structured around us.

As Aristotle pointed out in the texts quoted above, there is a parallelism between what we see, and how we see it. The first face seen in our life is, most probably the face of one of our parents. The relatives are most close to us, and the relative in nature is perceived according to as it presents itself between those faces. The existence of man is by nature “relative.”

We embark on the journey of our life equipped with the idea of some distant call bringing about the quietude notwithstanding the vagaries of our life. The word, the reason of the perceived, conceived in our mind is but a remote reverberation of the distant call of the “Father and Maker,” because it proper to a father to engender both an offspring and the word of wisdom.

As commonly granted, science is a realm of reason. As though, also, not only science seems to be of value for many, there is to be found another realm of the human activity besides. Apparently, it seems, by the same token, to be besides reason. Consequently, there were something, possibly even irrational in man endowed with some value. A consequence occurs that it are emotions that are of reasonable importance in our life, too. We had, then, to draw a line between the two realms lest impoverish human existence by seeing it unilaterally only.

But let us consider some aspect of this, say, discovery, or, if you like, concession. What the very “drawing of the line” consist in? Is it a work of reason, or, rather, yielding to something irrational in us that calls for its “rights”? By being not precise, or, all the more forsaken in that matter, we run the risk of seeing

both the realms of human existence distorted. Thus, we could see the “libido” “scientifically” (Freud); or science “mystically” (Bergson).

But, possibly, there is something connected with the kind of activity that cannot be subsumed under both “rational” and “irrational” in us. Let us call it yearning for something more which (yearning) lies at bottom of the hole human activity whatever. *More* than what, then? Well, more than both the “rational” and “irrational.”

All this amounts to saying that “the line drawn” has its own breadth, or, let have it this way, its own dimension. Moreover, there is nothing impossible in assuming that this “drawing of the line” is just more than the “rational” and “irrational” in us. Maybe, it is more primitive, too, because before we commit ourselves to the cause of “progress” or to the pursuit of our own happiness, we must draw a precise distinction to be followed in our life since. And it is just that distinction that makes for the science to be rational and for the love to be, as it seems, more valuable than mere arithmetical equations. Consequently, we have to assume that is a source of both reason and love. Were it not the case, our life would be a mere haphazard movement towards some unknown direction. The point is that the direction is given in the very “dimension of the discernment.” If set in its proper light, it endows both the rational with being desirable, and the sought for with being reasonable. In other words, there is something precious and desirable in science itself, and there is something reasonable and ordered in love, also. They both seem to be but two aspects of the same thing approached from different sides.

Still, it is impossible to love ideas, and too, it is impossible to set down scientific laws that are not, to some degree, at least, general. How are, then the two aforesaid aspects to be reconciled? Perhaps the end of both is, paradoxically, at the same time, both individual and general, or, if you like, is more or none of them, strictly speaking. There is to be found a principle of the order of the Universe, as science considers some at least particular order thereof. There is, however, too, a first impulse of our will towards the good, and the good cannot be placed otherwise that amongst individuals that encounter us.

If Neoplatonics were right in claiming that love consists in propagating itself, and in fact, fatherhood consist not only in propagating of genes but of wisdom and skills, also, the first source of something being individual must be individual to the highest degree. This principle must be, paradoxically, both general (as a source of the general order of things) and individual (as a source focusing all the individual striving for the good). It both propagates the good commonly, and attracts each individual intellect by showing to it the sighs thereof. The principle, the *Arche*, has been identified by Aristotle as Θεός, and the realm of the border between the two aforesaid realms had been allotted to θεολογικ». The science is now better known under the name of Metaphysics. Its end consist in the cognizance of God.

Our ascend towards the Ultimate can be marked both by the hope and despair; by the eagerness and lassitude. Those attitudes are, primarily connected with the

notion of something beyond to be achieved. The Greek Logos is both the order and the name we give it—the spoken of and the way we do speak. Similarly, the world is, first of all, the Cosmos. According to Greeks, the upright life consists in living according to Nature, and the rational nature in particular, which is to live *Ἐμολογούμεσθω τῇ φύσει*. As, however, it is tempting to underscore the second aspect of Logos to the detriment of the former, a special attitude emerges: Rationalism. A rationalist is not that much concerned with an adequate judgment of reality, as with the judgment itself, the existence of reality being of the secondary importance. Instead of seeking the order itself, he presumes to be the very source thereof; instead of discovering laws, he presumes to be a law-giver. The rationalist creates a special realm of the so-called “more human world;” as, however the real world remains totally indifferent towards such generous attempts, the only effect of creating such a “more human world” is to regard more and more individuals as less than human; unable to live up to high standards set down. As, however, it is impossible for a long time to live in such a seclusion, a twin-brother of Rationalism emerges: Sentimentalism. Already Plato was perfectly aware of the danger of the so-called “misologia.”²¹ That kind of spiritual illness can befall even a rationalist. First rationalist, Pascal ended up with proclaiming Fideism and heart-rending complaints about the fragility of human existence. Normally, we expect the rational principles of our life to be major premises in the rational plan of our life, built as a strict syllogism in the Aristotelian sense. Still, a plan can be merely rationalistic, and not just rational. The alleged rationality tumbles as soon as faced with the real world. One can live in this “rationalistic enclosure” for some time only to experience the waking up more painfully. The only rest to be found abides in the transcendent order of the world leading eventually to the transcendent Principle thereof.

All those, as it were, “scattered” remarks has been plainly summarized in Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa contra Gentiles*.

“Following a diversity of natures, one finds a diverse manner of emanation in things, and, the higher a nature is, the more intimate to the nature is that which flows from it.”²² In plants “one has already found the first grade of life, for living things are those which move themselves to action, but those which can move only things external to them are entirely devoid of life.”²³ Animals are obviously alive, but there is also “the supreme and perfect grade of life which is in the intellect, for the intellect reflects upon itself and the intellect can understand itself.”²⁴ This life consists, as has been said, in the grasping intellectually the order “intended” in nature.

²¹ Plato, *Phaedo*, Ch. XXXIX, 89 CD.

²² Thomas Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, IV, Chapter 1, n. 1 (translated by Charles J. O’Neil).

²³ *Ibidem*, n. 3.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, n. 5.

I mean by the “intention understood” what the intellect conceives in itself of the thing understood. To be sure, in us this is neither the thing which is understood nor is it the very substance of the intellect. But it is a certain likeness of the thing understood conceived in the intellect, and which the exterior words signify. So, the intention itself is named the “interior word” which is signified by the exterior word.²⁵

The perfection of life is proportionate to how intimate an “emanation” is.

Now, whatever is understood should, as understood, be in him who understands, for the significance of the very act of understanding is this: the grasping of that which is understood by an intellect; . . . But, the thing understood is in him who understands the intention understood and the word.²⁶

The word is “a kind of likeness, as it were, of the true man which the intellect grasps.”²⁷

But in the essence of interior word which is the intention understood there is this: that it proceeds from the one understanding in accord with his act of understanding, since it is, so to say, the intellectual term of the operation. For, in the act of understanding, the intellect conceives and forms the intention or the essence understood, and this is the interior word.²⁸

Aquinas accounts for the fact that an image can bear a similarity to the word in the following wise:

Now, there is a difference between intellect and sense, for sense grasps a thing in its exterior accidents, which are color, taste, quantity and others of this kind, but intellect enters into what is interior to the thing. And, since every knowledge is perfected by the likeness between the knower and the known, there must be in the sense a likeness of the thing in its sensible accidents, but in the intellect there must be a likeness of the thing understood in its essence. Therefore, the word conceived in the intellect is the image or the exemplar of the substance of the thing understood.²⁹

The understanding of what the real Fatherhood and Sonship consists in crowns these considerations:

For our intellect knows some things naturally; thus the first principles of the intelligibles, whose intelligible conceptions—called interior words—naturally exist in the intellect and proceed from it. There are also certain intelligibles which our intellect does not know naturally; rather, it arrives at the knowledge of these by reasoning. The conceptions of these last do not exist in our intellect naturally, but are sought after by study. But, this is the essential of true generation in living things: that which is generated proceeds from him who generates as his likeness, and as identified with him in nature.³⁰

²⁵ *Ibidem*, n. 6.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, n. 9.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, n. 11.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, n. 13.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, n. 15.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, n. 17.

Piotr Cycjiura

Verbum interius

Abstract

The language seems to be the indispensable means of human thought. Most probably, human existence, which consists chiefly in understanding and willing, is impossible without words. To put this otherwise: the quality of human existence depends on how neat and precise the words we use are. Figuratively speaking, one could try to „depict” the „reality”. And both termini seem to be at their own place here. For it is an „all-encompassing” idea of what encounters us that is so alluring. To the contrary, the enticing force of truth lies buried deeply in the sensual data of the experience. However, it is essential to abstract it therefrom. The „picturing” and „telling” are essentially opposed. The human word is the image of the interiorly conceived idea; and cannot „correspond” directly to any particular thing, no matter how elaborate the lineaments of the latter. Particular things are not directly cognizable, and are of no importance (as far as entangled in the spatio-temporal) for human existence. True, the intellect grasps a unity while elaborating a scientific system of the world. But it is save a unity of the order - the most feeble one; the unity that depends essentially on the Transcendent Principle of the whole.

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