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Spis treści „Filo-Sofiji”, vol. 19 (2012/4)
Contents „Filo-Sofija”, vol. 19 (2012/4)
Od redakcji. O wiedzy Boga, Jego wszechmocy i ludzkiej wolności
Marek Pepliński Editorial. On God’s Knowledge, Omnipotence, and Human Freedom Abstract Ancient and mediaeval encounters between religious monotheistic faith and philosophical reason brings philosophers and theologians to task how to add up facts perceived from philosophical, natural and religious perspectives. There are several important points in which reason and faith seems to be in disagreement. One of them is the group of problems connected to the topics of coherence of divine attributes, particularly omniscience, foreknowledge and omnipotence, on the one hand, and the human freedom, on the another. This editorial shows how are different angles of problems of human freedom, foreknowledge, middle knowledge, eternity, fatalism and open theism connected in papers of this volume of Filo-sofija journal. Keywords: omniscience; foreknowledge; omnipotence; coherence of faith and reason; open theism, immutability of God’s knowledge, libertarian account of freedom; eternal life; fourteenth-century theology.
Kuszenie i wolna wola. O pewnym rozwiązaniu problemu natury relacji między ludzką wolnością a wszechwiedzą Boga
Temptation and Free Will. A Solution to the Problem of the Relationship Between Human Free Will and God’s Omniscience The article aims to show that none of the today discussed positions concerning the relationship between human free will and God’s omniscience—determinism, compatibilism, molinism and libertarianian revisionism—is an adequate solution and proposes a position to some extent resembling Kant’s solution to his Third Antinomy, where he made the distinction between subject as causa phenomenon and subject as causanoumenon. God possesses not only an absolute knowledge concerning all processes and events in the world, but He also has a full knowledge concerning what all human subjects will decide to do. Nevertheless, His absolute knowledge in this sense is compatible with human freedom, because ‘real freedom’ is ‘located’—as a causality of freedom—in individual human natures which already exist in eternity and of which our actual inner experience gives us only a ‘sensual scheme’ (Kant). Human persons are tempted by different life experiences which they receive, i.e. they are tested by God and it cannot be excluded that some of these personal essences will turn out to be only illusory and in this sense will be condemned. For all other persons worldly experience was planned by God as a necessary element of their future eternal life. Keywords:God, omniscience, freedom, determinism, eternal life, persons.
Traditional theism (in Christianity, Judaism and Islam) understands God as possessing certain attributes including omnipotence. God is omnipotent in the sense that God possesses unlimited (maximal) power. For some classical philosophers and theologians (PetrusDamiani, René Descartes) God’s omnipotence requires his being able to do absolutely anything, including the logically impossible. But in Thomas Aquinas’ opinion, to do what is logically impossible is not an act of power but is self-contradictory action. For Aquinas, a logically impossible action is not an action. The contemporary British philosopher of religion, Richard Swinburne, considers omnipotence from an analytic perspective and, partially,within Aquinas’ tradition. For Swinburne, omnipotence includes the power to perform only logically possible and consistent tasks. In this paper, I discuss systematically (§§ 3-6) the philosophical and logical problems of omnipotence and the relation between God and logic from the perspective of Jan Łukasiewicz’s logical investigations. Keywords: Omnipotence, God, logic, rationality, Richard Swinburne, Jan Łukasiewicz.
Futura contingentia jako przedmiot wiedzy Boga. Stanowisko Jana Dunsa Szkota
God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents. John Duns Scotus’ Explanation The article concerns John Duns Scotus’ views on the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, presented by Scotus in his Lectura in librum primum Sententiarumd. 39, n. 1-93. He begins his analysis of the notion of God’s knowledge concerning the future events by criticizing two theories: first, the claim that the content of the idea of a thing, possessed by God, can include contingency of this thing; second, the claim that eternity of God is simultaneous with the flowing time as a whole, and therefore His knowledge of future contingents is the knowledge of present contingents. Duns Scotus presents his own conception in the form of the following claims: (1) there is contingency in the reality, however, we are not able to prove it; (2) the proximate second causes are not the causes of contingency in things; (3) the main cause of contingency in reality is God, precisely His will. Thus, contingency is not an imperfection because it is produced immediately by God. The article also presents Scotus’ theory of synchronic contingency. This conception explains the possibility of God’s contingent knowledge of contingent reality. Keywords: John Duns Scotus, future contingents, God’s knowledge, free will, necessity, contingency.
Co – zdaniem angielskich myślicieli XIV wieku – Bóg wie o przygodnej przyszłości?
What does God know about future contingents? – according to some fourteenth-century English thinkers The paper is concerned with the problem of God’s knowledge aboutfuture contingents, which has raised many doubts connected with the incompatibility of certainty and necessity of God’s knowledge and contingency of future events, or, even more, with the incompatibility of God’s precognition causing necessary events with human’s free choice guaranteed by his free will. From the very beginning of the Middle Ages theologians tried to find solutions to these questions, but—in my opinion—the most interesting ones were those expressed by John Duns Scotus. This paper presents mostly the theories of some English thinkers who were active at Oxford Universityin the 14th century and who criticized or agreed with Scotus’s ideas. They introduced new terminology and clarified particular problems initiating original logico-theological debates, in which the problem of God’s action with regard to His potentiaabsoluta et ordinataplayed the main role. Keywords: Middle Ages theologians, English thinkers, God’s knowledge, future contingents.
Eternity and Omniscience This paper addresses the problem of the relationship between the two attributes: eternity and omniscience. Einstein’s theory of relativity and the related concept of time allows for a convincing reinterpretation of the classical conception of eternity as timelessness. I introduce this conception in the terms proposed by two analytical Thomists,Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann. Given their conception of eternity, we can consistently define other attributes of the absolute being and defend the strong concept of omniscience. Keywords: God’s attributes, omniscience, time, Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann, conception of eternity.
Wszechwiedza Boża a problem zła z perspektywy teizmu otwartego
Divine Omniscience and the Problem of Evil from the Perspective of Open Theism In the first part of the article, I present the argument for theological fatalism consisting in the thesis that if God has an infallible knowledge of future contingents, then whatever happens in the world happens necessarily. Next, I discuss the open theism view, whose rejection of theological fatalism rests on the claim that God does not know future contingents in advance. In the second part of the paper, I analyze the open theism view in the context of the evidential argument from evil. The evidential argument from evil says that the occurrence of great and pointless suffering in the world makes the existence of God very improbable. The open theism view implies that since God does not know the future contingents (great and pointless evils included), the occurrence of such evils does not compromise his omnipotence or his benevolence, and, hence, it does not make his existence improbable. In the last part of the article, I make some critical remarks on the theodicy of open theism recently put forth by William Hasker and I emphasize that this theodicy is based on axiological assumptions which are not evident enough in themselves. Keywords: problem of evil, open theism, evidential argument, divine omniscience.
Miejsce koncepcji ograniczonej wiedzy Boga w strukturze "teizmu otwartego"
On Limited Divine Knowledge in the structure of Open Theism ‘Open Theism,’ also known as ‘open theology,’ ‘open view’ and ‘openness of God’ is not a new philosophical position, but it has not been presented and analyzed in detail in the Polish philosophy of religion. Open theism is a significant modification of the traditional Christian concept of God, some important aspects of God’s nature and God’s relationship with the world created by Him. Briefly speaking, ‘open theism’ is a philosophical model of God and His activity in the world, made on the basis of analytical philosophy of religion, referring to the biblical image of God, including such issues as God’s omniscience, human freedom, the problem of evil and providence. Sometimes ‘open theism’ is also referred to as ‘free will theism’, because it is concerned with the problem of the freedom of human will and the related question of God’s omniscience. It is this latter issue that seems to be regarded by advocates of ‘open theism’ as the essential point. So someone can get the impression that the central content of this philosophical position is the problem of God’s knowledge (His foreknowledge) and the limitations of this knowledgecharacteristic of ‘open theism’. In the light of a closer analysis, however, it turns out that it is important to define precisely the role of the concept of God’s limited knowledge in the structure of ‘open theism.’ This article aims to reconstruct and present the essential elements of the ‘open theism’ with particular emphasis on the role played in it by the concept of God’s limited foreknowledge, and to clarify the place of individual elements of the structure and their relationships. Keywords: open theism, God’s foreknowledge, free will, concept of God.
Molinism and the Problem of Moral Evil One of the best known solutions to the problem of evil is the free will theodicy. The aim of Molinism is to reconcile the libertarian notion of free will and the traditional idea of Divine Providence. But Molinism is based on the assumption that God has a middle knowledge, i.e. He knows the truth value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. The possibility of such knowledge has been called into question by contemporary critics of Molinism. The problem is that without middle knowledge, the Molinist account of Providence and the free will theodicy is impossible. My claim is that even if it is taken for granted that middle knowledge is possible, a Molinist needs more than simple free will theodicy to solve the problem of evil. Keywords: Molinism, middle knowledge, problem of evil, theodicy, providence.
Wiedza przedziwna. Akwinata o niezmienności i wieczności wiedzy Boskiej
Wonderful Knowledge. Aquinas on the Immutability and Eternity of God’s Knowledge The general concept of knowledge is a kind of concept closely akin to transcententals: its use is not restricted to a certain kind of being, and it does not itself designate a kind of entity. Such concepts may be applied to God not as metaphors: when we grasp (through the analysis of cases of finite knowledge) some general traits of knowledge as such, we can show that God has knowledge, and his knowledge, as opposed to ours, is infinitely perfect. We have no insight into this realization of knowledge as opposed to ours, but as far as we know what general traits of knowledge are, it is important to know that God has infinitely perfect knowledge. To grasp the general traits of knowledge, I focus on the topic of mutability and immutability of knowledge analyzed systematically by Aquinas, and thus on the topic of identity criteria specific for knowledge in general: the question of when knowledge that p and knowledge that q are (in a certain knower) one and the same knowledge; the criteria of identity of knowledge vary according to natures of knowers. I think that the problem of the criteria of identity of knowledge is rather neglected in omniscience-immutability discussions. I analyze Aquinas’ arguments for the thesis that human knowledge is mutable, and God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable (they concern the role of tense). The analysis sheds light on some general traits of knowledge: it is always something formulated by the knower which manifests some truth to him, and in general the way it is formulated corresponds to (i) the way it manifests some truth, (ii) its identity criteria, (iii) the way it is propositional, (iv) the way it is related to tense, and finally (v) the nature of the knower. Focusing on the criteria of the identity of knowledge shows that God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable, and that time and change in its objects are nevertheless undoubtedly real. Keywords: God’s knowledge, knowledge, criteria of identity of knowledge, immutability; tense; transcendentals; omniscience-immutability arguments.
Czy wiedzy Boga nie da się pogodzić z wolnością człowieka? Krytyczna analiza niektórych argumentów
Is Divine Knowledge Incompatible with Human Freedom? An Analysis of Some Arguments The problem that divine omniscience or divine foreknowledge makes free will impossible belongs to notoriously difficult to solve. In XX century one of the most important interpretation of this difficulty was provided by Nelson Pike. If God believes infallibly and in advance how Smith will act, this fact about the past excludes out all alternatives for Smith. But libertarian account of free will requires alternatives possibilities, so, it could be argue that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with our free will. This paper carefully criticizes Pike’s argumentation and suggests that because God’s foreknowledge doesn’t eliminate future alternatives through causal means, it is compatible with free will and that Pike’s argument and two briefly analyzed standard arguments for fatalism presented by Zagzebski failed. Keywords: Divine knowledge; omniscience; foreknowledge; human freedom, Nelson Pike, Linda TrinkausZagzebski.
Russellowska krytyka argumentów na rzecz istnienia Boga
Bertrand Russell’s Critique of the Arguments for the Existence of God The paper presents Bertrand Russell’s critique of arguments for the existence of God. I divided the theistic arguments which Russell criticizes into three groups. The first group involves arguments concerning the relation between Universe and God: the First Cause argument, the Natural law argument and the argument from Design. The second group is related to the concept of God as a moral Lawmaker and it contains the argument from morality and the argument from remedy for injustice. The last group of arguments pertains to the relation between God and human beings. Here, I consider Russell's reflections on the validity of the argument from religious experience and his approach to the issue of the foundation of religion. The aim of this article is to consider whether Russellian argumentation against evidence for God's existence is justified. Keywords: Bertrand Russell, existence of God, argument, philosophy of religion, evidence.
Koncepcja śmierci mózgowej w świetle analiz: czy da się ją obronić?
The Brain Death Reconsidered – Is It a Tenable Concept? Since 1968 it has been recognized in the medical practice that irreversible coma connected with apnea can serve as a criterion of human death. This approach was first introduced in the so called Harvard Protocol. As a result of the work of this commission, the brain-based criteria of human death were quickly legally introduced in America and in most countries in the world. The only symptom on which death can be pronounced is, according to this new definition, the absence of spontaneous brain function. However, the acceptance of the new definition of death did not eliminate the old one completely. In many states both old and new definitions of death are legally valid. Practically, in these countries the alternative definition of death functions alongside the old one and diagnosis of death can be based both on the cardiac/respiratory and brain symptoms. One of the few exceptions proved to be Japan. The law in this country does not provide a uniform answer to the question of what human death is. Instead, it allows people to choose between traditional death and brain death. The law states that if a person wants to be an organ donor after brain death has occurred, he or she must record that intention on a donor card or label beforehand. Those who object to brain death and transplantation do not need donor cards. They are considered to be alive until the heart stops beating. In this way the Japanese law respects the opinion of 20-40% of the society who do not believe in the brain death. The opinion of the same percentage of people in Western societies who oppose BD is ignored by their legal systems. Initially the concept of BD did not cause a lot of controversy but this situation changed in the nineties of the last century. Since then many authors have criticized the validity of the brain-based criteria of death. They maintain that it is impossible to declare the absence of all the functions of the whole brain on the basis of the clinical tests supposed to detect it. There may be present some level of consciousness in brain death (BD) patients and therefore, they may feel pain. It is significant that 27% of the members of the teams which perform the excision of the heart for transplantation think that they are killing a living person and that in many countries during this operation a normal general anesthesia is required because of the vivid reaction of the body of the patient. The opponents of the brain death theory stress that the accurate examination of the so-called brain dead persons shows the persistence of the functions of significant parts of their brains. There are EEG waves recorded in 20-40% of BD patients. Event related potentials (ERP) show the reaction to verbal and non-verbal stimuli and the hormone production by the brain tissue can be detected in many BD people. The proper treatment could not only significantly prolong lives of the BD patients, but around 60% of possible donors with the lowest result of 3 in Glasgow Coma Scale could be restored to normal life if their brain edema is properly treated. This treatment should be based on the therapeutic hypothermia connected with the application of the thyroid hormones, whose level is usually too low in the patients with the brain injury. There is a growing lack of consensus regarding the issue of brain death, especially among physicians. Some regard brain death as a biological one, some as the death of the person but not of the human body, and the rest, as a definition accepted by the society, which doesn’t require other legitimacy than the freely chosen criteria. The brain death concept is also criticized from the philosophical point of view. The strength of the brain death theory was based on the premise that the brain is the integrating center of the body. According to this argument, the death of the brain means that the organism ceases to exist for it is no longer a functioning whole. To this argument the opponents of the brain death concept say that this question is not a question a priori but an empirical one and that the empirical data validate the opposite opinion, which says that the bodies of brain dead patients are alive. Some widely known cases show that even the real death of the entire brain means the death of the body and, therefore, may not signify the death of a human person. The integration of the body is the function of the organism as a whole and not of a single organ, even if this organ is the brain. This point of view can be confirmed by the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas who says that the soul is primarily and per se connected with the body as a whole as the proportionate perfectible and only secondarily with the parts of the body, according to their ordination to the whole. So, the death of any single organ does not preclude the union of the soul with the rest of the body as a living whole. Moreover, the terms such as “consciousness” and “person” should not be identified. The term such as “human living nonpersons”, proposed by some bioethicists and referring to the people without consciousness has not been accepted in the official documents concerning BD. Bodies of the BD people are alive, therefore, it is not right to use the term “brain death” to describe the state of these patients, but rather the term “brain failure” should be used. As the result, according to some authors, the dead donor rule should be abolished. The Catholic Church stresses the sacredness of the human life from the beginning to the end. Therefore She requires that there be no doubts that the donor in BD is really dead. Because of the lack of consensus among physicians, philosophers and theologians, the popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI decided to continue the scientific research and discussion concerning BD between the representatives of various disciplines. Keywords: brain death, brain edema, global ischemic penumbra, therapeutic hypothermia, consciousness, person, substantial form.
Problem istnienia w platonizmie w świetle nauki św. Tomasza z Akwinu
THE PROBLEM OF BEING IN PLATONISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THOMAS AQUINAS. A META-SYSTEMATIC ESSAY In spite of the apparent opposition to Plato, Aristotle accepted a lot from the thought of his master. The intuition, which plays the key role in the system of Plato, was understood by Aristotle in terms of how we grasp the middle term of syllogism. It is not, therefore, the intuition of being, but the reasoning, departing from the experience (nature’s “intention”), which is the way of the cognition of the ultimate. The teleology of being, which Plato was so keen on finding, was found by Aristotle in the physical world as a counterpart of motion. Alas, Aristotle lost sight of what is most valuable in Plato: the sense of being that transgresses the categories. According to Thomas, being is what is the most perfect in things; so, consequently, what is the proper effect of the Ultimate Cause, and what is Its primary aim. It is better to be, i.e. to exist. Each thing craves for being. Being, however, is, in the Dionysius’ sense, a problem; it might guide us to God, but veil Him before us as well. It is a perfection, but not the Perfection itself, Plato was right at this point. Keywords: BEING, PLATO, ARISTOTLE, THOMAS AQUINAS
Stanowisko Eduarda von Hartmanna wobec pojęcia rzeczy samej w sobie Immanuela Kanta
EDUARD VON HARTMANN ON IMMANUEL KANT’S CONCEPT OF THE THING IN ITSELF Abstract Immanuel Kant argues that recognition of the object of knowledge must be limited to the cognitive capacities of the subject. Hartmann takes the view that such an approach to the object of knowledge cannot lead to objectivity. He stated the necessity of the cognition referring to the thing in itself. The thing in itself, despite its fundamental unknowability, must be the basis of all cognition. Thus, our cognition can be achieved only secondarily on the basis of the thing in itself. Keywords: EDUARD VON HARTMANN, IMMANUEL KANT, THING IN ITSELF, EPISTEMOLOGY, ONTOLOGY, COGNIZANCE, NEOKANTIANISM
Zagadka miłości Anny Kareniny (analiza egzystencjalna)
A MYSTERY IN ANNA KARENINA’S LOVE – AN EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS APPROACH Abstract The article aims to interpret Anna Karenina’s love from the perspective of generally understood existential philosophy. The article’s leitmotif is related to the sources of Anna’s unhappiness within the role of a mistress. Her affection appears to be a puzzle, as the unhappy trait of her feeling is impossible to be explained with the mere help of a cliché: the lovers yearn to be together, but they are hampered by external circumstances. The unhappiness in Anna’s love results from the internal, not external, reasons. Anna fears that she may lose the devotion of her Beloved, and that very fear shows itself as no less than an obscured existential anxiety. However much effort Anna makes to veil the anxiety felt with the love towards Count Vronsky, she cannot succeed, for she fails to realize that both phenomena, the love to Vronsky and the anxiety, are entangled in the question „who am I?” concerning the issue of personal identity. Anna does not understand that as long as she does not face the question, it will be difficult for her to release her mind from the distractive experience of the continual recurrence of the anxiety in the background of her love towards Vronsky. Keywords: ANNA KARENINA, LOVE, MYSTERY, UNHAPPINESS, FEAR, ANXIETY, PERSONAL IDENTITY
Natura historyzmu. Główne pojęcia i tezy wykładni Ernsta Troeltscha
THE NATURE OF HISTORISM. THE MAIN CONCEPTS AND THESES OF ERNST TROELTSCH’S INTERPRETATION The article aims to present the main elements of Ernst Troeltsch’s conception of historism. Historism is understood here as a way of thinking (in science or worldview), which is directed to explain things as products of a historical process. In this view, there is no place for any absolute or universal solutions, causes and rules (thus historism is something completely different from historicism in K.R. Popper’s sense). In the first step, the author tries to show the philosophical context of Troeltsch’s thought (Hegel, Dilthey, Neo-Kantianism, Fenomenology) and to present some of the most important ideas connected with historism (like irrationalism, subjectivism, relativism and individuality). The main part of the article discusses Troeltsch’s conception according to the first chapter of his “Historismus und seine Probleme.” This part presents Troeltsch’s opinion about the crisis of historism and his vision of the real philosophy of history, which should be based on a formal logic of history. Keywords: HISTORISM, ERNST TROELTSCH, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
Ontologia fundamentalna Martina Heideggera – rzeczywistość zamknięta w Dasein. Próba interpretacji
MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY – REALITY ENCLOSED IN DASEIN Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was supposed to divert philosophy towards the absolutely fundamental issue, which in the history of philosophy, unfortunately, as the author claimed, had been neglected. It was an attempt to designate the real foundation, which western metaphysics – while forgetting about being – had never touched. Thus, Heidegger focused on being. He asked about its sense, the way in which it can be described and explained. The answer was to be found in the analysis of some special being – the human being. Only man, who exists in such a way (Heidegger uses the concept of Dasein) that by his very nature refers to being, is “open” to being. This article shows Heidegger’s explanation based on the analysis of man’s being, connecting the existence of reality with human existence, in its essence making the world thoroughly dependent on man, enclosing the world in Dasein. The world ceases to be the whole reality consisting of particular essences existing independently of man. It becomes “the condition”, the way of being. In the first part, the author presents how the fundamental ontology, while placing being at the centre of the discourse and using the phenomenological method, directs the attention to man. When asking about being, it asks about Dasein, about the way of man’s being. Then, the paper presents the existential analytics, the hermeneutics of Dasein, which is crucial from the point of view of Heidegger’s philosophy. The author explains what Heidegger’s existentials are and what it means that man exists as “being-in-the world”, that he exists in a way of “care”. Finally, it is shown that such an understanding of human being, the way in which he cares about the world and understands the world, i.e. designs it, results in enclosing the world in Dasein. The very sense of reality becomes thus the sense of human existence. Keywords: FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, REALITY, DASEIN
JULIAN DODD’S MUSICAL PLATONISM The purpose of the paper is to analyse Julian Dodd’s musical Platonism in the ontology of works of music. Dodd defends two views; first, that musical works are norm-types the tokens of which are dateable, locatable patterns of sounds. Second, that musical works are entities individuated purely in terms of how they sound. The main results of the analysis is the rejection of the following Dodd’s theses: 1. that types exist eternally; 2. that they are unstructured; 3.that their identity is determined by the condition that something must meet to be one of its tokens. Keywords: ONTOLOGY OF WORKS OF MUSIC, MUSICAL PLATONISM, JULIAN DODD
Religijność bez Boga i wiary. Z inspiracji Jerzego Grotowskiego
RELIGIOUSNESS WITHOUT GOD AND FAITH. INSPIRED BY JERZY GROTOWSKI The purpose of this article is to present a certain idea of religiousness. It could be called religiousness without God and without faith. I found its premises in the work of the Polish theatre reformer Jerzy Grotowski. He was neither a prophet nor the founder of the religion; primarily, he was a man of theatre. But for him, in the age of “God’s death” the theatre was a substitute of religion and religious experience. He understood his “poor theatre” as a search for sense of life, an authentic life and the world’s salvation. At various stages of his artistic way, which I present in the first unit of this article, he tried to reach to deeper dimensions of reality. In the end, he went far beyond the theatre. In the second unit, I show the features of religiousness without God and faith. In this religiousness, God exists and does not exists, he is a question, or doubtfulness. The Faith is a physical action, instead of seriousness, we have irony, grotesque, buffo. Keywords: GOD, FAITH, RELIGIOUSNESS, JERZY GROTOWSKI
OBJECTIVE PREDICATION The author claims that there are two kinds of predicates that are used to describe cognitive states of mind like beliefs or perception. Using some of them, one can describe the cognitive states of mind directly, whereas using some others, one can describe these states in comparison with one’s own. For example, one can say that a person has a belief or one can say that that person’s belief is according to his own beliefs. In the latter situation, he uses the predicate “to know”. The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John knows that p” are as follows: (1) Peter believes that John believes that p; (2) Peter believes that p; (3) Peter believes that the reasons for which John believes that p have a good justification. In a similar way one can ascribe to somebody a visual impression of an object x or to compare that person’s impressions with his own cognitive states. In the latter situation one uses the predicate “to see” (to perceive). The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John can see x” are the following: (I) Peter believes that John has visual impression of object x; (II) Peter believes that object x exists; (III) Peter believes that this that John has visual impression of object x is according to the laws of vision. When one uses predicates that describe cognitive states of mind of a person (possession of beliefs or sensory impressions), one speaks subjectively, whereas when one speaks objectively, he uses predicates that allow him to compare cognitive states of mind of a person with his own. Keywords: PREDICATION, BELIEFS, PERCEPTION
Jerzy Kmita (26 grudnia 1931 — 24 lipca 2012) Uczony-humanista, filozof, metodolog, kulturoznawca, twórca szkoły naukowej i fi lozoficznej
Mowa wygłoszona na uroczystości pogrzebowej 31 lipca 2012 r. ku czci Profesora Jerzego Kmity
Od badań metodologicznych do kulturoznawczych – naukowa droga Krystyny Zamiary (1940–2012)
Uwagi na temat koncepcji semantyki Jerzego Kmity
SOME REMARKS ON JERZY KMITA’S CONCEPT OF SEMANTICS This article presents the evolution of the concept of semantics by Jerzy Kmita. Three stages could be distinguished in his conception; the first stage is present in his two works, Szkice z teorii poznania naukowego and Z problemów epistemologii historycznej. His book Kultura i poznanie represents the second stage, and the third stage was developed in Jak słowa łączą się ze światem. “Krytyczne stadium neopragmatyzmu,” which is an article on the concept already present in Kultura i poznanie. I intend to compare Kmita’s views with elements of the philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Keywords: SEMANTICS, HUMANISTIC FACTOR, SEMANTIC ASSUMPTIONS, ESSENTIAL FORM, POSTMODERNISM
Sensemaking– wiedza i kultura organizacji w świetle humanistyki zintegrowanej
SENSEMAKING. ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE IN THE LIGHT OF INTEGRATED HUMANITIES Definitions of organizational culture usually focus on shared symbols, rituals, behavioral patterns, or even propositional assumptions concerning reality. Such phenomena represent heterogeneous collection of objects, events, and processes. Instead, the paradigm of integrated humanities defines organizational culture in terms of beliefs which provide both practical instructions for agents and shared interpretative schemes which guide the understanding of the environment. In this context, the process of “sensemaking” is understood as a knowledge-based act of cultural sense-giving or of culturally mediated construction of organizational reality. Since the meaning-creation process seems to be both culturally mediated and knowledge-based, the perspective presented in the paper is defined as an “epistemic model of organizational culture”. Keywords: SENSEMAKING, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE, ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE, TACIT KNOWLEDGE, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, CULTURE, KNOW-HOW
Zagadnienie eudajmonizmu i etyki stosowanej w świetle teorii kultury
THE PROBLEM OF EUDAIMONISM AND APPLIED ETHICS IN THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF CULTURE This paper is situated within some contemporary debates over the problem of the gap between professional ethical reflection and moral practice. Starting with J. Habermas’ thesis about the deficiency of communication between expert cultures and the world of everyday life, and J. Kmita’s culture-theoretical analysis of the process of liberation of the worldview from practical spheres of culture, the author explicates the problem of a discrepancy between the universal claims of normative ethics and the individualistic perspective of eudaimonism. On the basis of Birnbacher’s considerations, the author introduces the concept of “applied ethics” which reconciles both normative and eudaimonistic approaches. Keywords: CULTURE, THEORY OF CULTURE, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, APPLIED ETHICS, WORLDVIEW, EUDAIMONISM, NORMATIVISM
Metafora „linii oporu” a zasada sprzeczności logicznej
THE METAPHOR OF THE “LINE OF RESISTANCE” AND THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION This essay presents the “idea of God” as a metaphor of the line of resistance – as used in Umberto Eco’s writings. This metaphor is understood in the sense of pure negativity. The pure negative, the pure “not,” is very different from the God of revealed religion. The idea of God is not a proof of the existence of God, but only a device of elocution – in order to give an appropriate name to the thing. Such interpretation is possible thanks to imputing to this idea the law of contradiction. Keywords: THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION, UMBERTO ECO, METAPHOR OF THE LINE OF RESISTANCE, IDEA OF GOD
Pojęcie komunikacji w poznańskiej szkole metodologicznej
THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE POZNAN SCHOOL METHODOLOGY The aim of this article is to describe the meaning of the concept of communication from the perspective of the socio-regulative theory of culture by Jerzy Kmita (as well as from the perspective of the Poznan School of Methodology in general). Many contemporary theories of human communication tend to avoid the social and cultural context of communication acts, which may be called a naturalistic approach to communication. This tendency is discussed in the paper. The socio-regulative theory of culture describes communication as one of the most important parts of symbolic culture and as a cultural act. This act of communication is characterized as rational and intentional and it connects the actors through the interpretation process. In conclusion, there is provided a sketch of theoretical background which opens the possibility to apply Kmita’s theory of culture to the theory of communication. Keywords: COMMUNICATION, CULTURE, INTERPRETATION, INTENTIONALITY, SOCIAL ACT, RATIONALITY, POZNAN SCHOOL METHODOLOGY
Cóż po racjonalności w czasie postmodernizmu?
RATIONALITY IN POSTMODERNISM? The aim of the article is to present analytical criticism of rationalism in a postmodern interpretation by I. Trzcińska in her book Logos, mit i ratio. Wybrane koncepcje racjonalności od XV do XVII wieku. The author of the article proves that the postmodern rationalistic interpretation is either irrational, since it abolishes the guiding principles of thinking and being (such as the law of contradiction and the principle of reason), or deficient in methodology. In the paper analyzed, the absence of quite essential arrangements for rationality as such is pointed out, just as the absence of a typology of possible rationality forms. The author claims that in the case of I. Trzcińska’s book we deal with both problems mentioned, which makes the book irrelevant to traditionally understood science. Keywords: ANALYTICAL CRITICISM, IRRATIONAL POSTMODERN, ABSENCE OF RATIONALITY FORMS
Balet Dawkinsa w ogrodzie teologii. Uwagi krytyczne w sprawie racjonalności głównych twierdzeń dotyczących wymiaru poznawczego twierdzeń o Bogu, zawartych w książce Richarda Dawkinsa Bóg urojony. Część I.
DAWKINS’ BALLET IN THE GARDEN OF THEOLOGY. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF RICHARD DAWKINS’ EPISTEMOLOGICAL THESES ON THEISTIC BELIEFS FROM THE GOD DELUSION. PART I My paper presents a detailed analysis and assessment of Richard Dawkins’ epistemological theses from The God Delusion concerning the nature of religious belief, the existence of God and treating belief in God as a scientific hypothesis. In the first part of the article, I am interpreting Dawkins’ statement that atheism deserves respect as an epistemic achievement. I suggest that rationality of that assessment depends on Dawkins’ success in arguing that science shows that God does not exist. My second aim is to show that the real object of Dawkins’ attack is not some abstract theistic hypothesis, as he suggests, but the Western ethical monotheism, mainly the Christian faith in God. If I am right, then his rejection of thus interpreted theism is not enough to justify his more general thesis that God hypothesis is false or improbable. The first part of the paper prepares the ground for the second, with criticism of Dawkins’ reasoning to the conclusion that almost certainly there is no God. Keywords: AGNOSTICISM, ATHEISM, BELIEF IN GOD, RICHARD DAWKINS, J. L. MACKIE, BASIL MITCHELL, RICHARD SWINBURNE, THEISM
Roberta Spaemanna nowe ujęcie klasycznej teorii osoby
ROBERT SPAEMANN’S NEW APPROACH TO THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF THE PERSON The article is concerned with the subject of the person, which constitutes the core of anthropological reflections of the eminent German thinker, Robert Spaemann. The issue of the person was especially noticeable in one of his most important works entitled Personen. This issue generated a keen interest and recognition of specialists in many countries. These reflections are based on the metaphysical concept of human existence. That is why Spaemann’s theory of the person is often defined as metaphysics of the person. First, in the introduction, the author points to the significance of the issue; second, he describes its most important threads: understanding the person, the person’s identity and traits such as rationality, freedom, intentionality, love, religiousness, transcendence, ability to forgive, to keep one’s promise and to speak. The next part of the article presents the issues of the person’s self-fulfilment, indestructibility, being the subject of law, having a special status, i.e. dignity. Readers also learn why the classical vision of the person (Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Kant) is not outdated, whereas Locke’s theory (as well as its radicalised version propagated by its well-known supporters, Parfit, Hoerster, Singer) remains unacceptable as contradictory in itself. As has been emphasized, it involves some false anthropological assumptions, e.g. the issue of the so-called potential person and the difference between human life and person’s life. However, the latter theory is increasingly popular at present since it supports, among others, the justifiability of abortion and euthanasia, and it suits the contemporary mentality with a definitely hedonist overtone. Many of Spaemann’s views on the person are truly significant and innovative. The issue that Spaemann himself regards as particularly important is his response to the false ideas of Locke and his contemporary continuators. The eminent scholar not only reveals the logical incoherence of this thought and its deviation from common sense, but using unique linguistic and transcendental-pragmatic argumentation, he proves that human is a person, i.e. “someone”, since the moment of conception. Thus, we cannot be thought of as if we had been “something” at first. That is why, not accidentally, the subtitle of Spaemann’s most important book on anthropology, i.e. Personen, is The difference between “someone” and “something”. In this response to Locke’s false theory (and its supporters), he explains that one cannot talk about such a distinction in the case of human beings. The second innovative issue in Spaemann’s work is the defence of the classical concept of the person and expressing it in a new way. The third one is his attempt at overcoming both spiritualistic and naturalistic perception of the human being. The fourth is Spaeman’s observation that our ability to forgive and to keep promises should be treated as a significant trait of the person. The article presents also some aspects of Spaemann’s vision of the person which have not been the subject of analyses yet, neither in the Polish nor in the Western literature, e.g. characteristics of the person, the person being the subject of laws and the person’s special status (ontological and moral dignity). Keywords: ROBERT SPAEMANN, THEORY OF THE PERSON, ONTOLOGICAL DIGNITY, MORAL DIGNITY
Naturalistyczna opozycja wobec kartezjanizmu
NATURALISTIC OPPOSITION AGAINST DESCARTES’S THOUGHT My aim is to point out the foundations of Descartes’s programmatic antinaturalism, but also the margin left by Descartes in his program for a dialogue with the followers of naturalism. The latter used it more than once, but this opening for a dialogue was interpreted by them as Descartes’s support for naturalism. In my opinion it is not only a false interpretation of the philosopher’s intention, but also a false presentation of his views on human nature and the world that surrounds us. Keywords: DESCARTES, ANTINATURALISM, NATURALISM
Problem historii filozofii w ujęcia XVII-wiecznej filozofii erudycyjnej oraz kartezjańskiego racjonalizmu
THE PROBLEM OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE 17TH-CENTURY ERUDITE PHILOSOPHY AND CARTESIAN RATIONALISM In the seventeenth century the comprehension of historic time refers to two ordering ideas: the declining idea of renaissance and the increasing cumulation idea. These ideas also affect the comprehension of a role which the history of philosophy is supposed to play in the system of knowledge and its historical development. The seventeenth-century conceptions of the history of philosophy are also influenced by some contemporary ideals of philosophical knowledge. In the article two such ideals are presented—the erudite school and Cartesian rationalism as well as their consequences which deal with understanding of philosophical tasks of the history of philosophy. Keywords: DECLINING IDEA OF RENAISSANCE, INCREASING CUMULATION IDEA, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, ERUDITE SCHOOL, CARTESIAN RATIONALISM
Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny i jej konsekwencje
DESCARTES’S CONCEPTION OF ANIMAL-MACHINE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Descartes claims that an animal is an automaton that operates by laws of mechanics. It doesn’t think, it doesn’t feel, and, therefore, it doesn’t suffer. So animals can be exploited without a guilty conscience and scientific experiments can be carried out on them. This view, very convenient for people, has followers nowadays, too. Keywords: DESCARTES, ANIMAL-MACHINE, PEOPLE
Kartezjańska koncepcja zwierzęcia-maszyny
ESCARTES’S CONCEPTION OF BEAST-MACHINE According to standard interpretations, Descartes asserted that animals were mere automata and did not feel pain. This interpretation is based on his notion of the beast-machine. In this article, I revise John Cottingham’s sevenfold analysis of that thesis. In Cottingham’s view, Descartes did insist that animals were automata and denied them consciousness and self-consciousness but it did not involve that animals do not feel. I support this view with some new arguments. I also point to the difference between Descartes’s original conception of animal and animality and the standpoint of his followers. Keywords: DESCARTES, CONCEPTION OF BEAST-MACHINE, JOHN COTTINGHAM, ANIMAL, CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
Spojrzeć poza horyzont. Pascal i problem perspektywy
TO SEE BEYOND THE HORIZON. BLAISE PASCAL AND THE QUESTION OF PERSPECTIVE The main purpose of this paper is to present some aspects of Blaise Pascal’s thought, especially his skeptic theory of human natural cognition, as related to his comments on the question of perspective and his technique of permanent changing the points of view. I argue that Pascal’s practice as well as his theoretical considerations on the art of perspective and geometrical optics demonstrate not only some kind of skepticism but a possible starting point to get to the metaphysical, invisible order from the visible world (irrespective of the grace of God). The fundamental condition of such metaphysical discovery is the situation of the lack of sense, of the impossibility to find any definitive answer to any of the questions that our reasoning has to cope with. Pascal finds the paradigmatic example of this “reading the world” in which any visible or intelligible meaning is available in the figural interpretation of the Bible, as opposed to its literal interpretation. At the same time Pascal does not propose any privileged point of view, any other perspective that human being could perceive as established, but always confronts us with Deus absconditus and his paradoxical traces. Keywords: BLAISE PASCAL, SKEPTIC THEORY, HUMAN NATURAL COGNITION, GEOMETRICAL OPTICS, METAPHYSICAL DISCOVERY, HORIZON
PASCAL’S SCEPTICISM Some of Pascal’s statements, like le „pyrronisme est le vrai”, suggest that he should be counted among sceptics, even though this claim seems to contradict the general appeal of his thought. Indeed, Pascal is known as a philosopher who desperately sought truth to finally find certainty in mystical experience. He did not deny that the human reason may have a chance to attain wisdom knowledge, provided that reason would not try to reach beyond its natural limits. Nevertheless, a kind of skepticism is certainly present in his philosophy. Its nature needs clarification, which is the aim of this paper. Drawing on a distinction made by I. Dąmbska between theoretical and normative scepticism, the author introduces the notion of existential skepticism, which most adequately renders Pascal’s view on the inability of reason to grasp by its own power the very nature of human condition. Keywords: PASCAL, SKEPTICISM, NATURE OF HUMAN CONDITION
W kwestii dowodów Spinozy na istnienie Boga i dowodu na jedyność Spinozjańskiej substancji
ON SPINOZA’S PROOFS OF (SPINOZIAN) GOD’S EXISTENCE AND THE PROOF OF THE UNIQUENESS OF THE SPINOZIAN SUBSTANCE In this paper I analyze Spinozian ontological arguments for God’s existence from Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. I argue that the first proof suffers from circulus vitiosus, whereas the others have at least one non-obvious premise. I also consider P. Gut’s modification of the first proof, reported to me during the conference “The Philosophy of the 17th Century—Its Origins and Continuations” (Gdańsk, 16.06.2011). Meanwhile, I address D. Chlastawa’s remark that theorem 7 and 14 from Ethica… makes Spinoza’s theory inconsistent. Keywords: SPINOZA, GOD’S EXISTENCE, PROOF, UNIQUENESS, SUBSTANCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY
Spinoza i Kant o naturze ludzkiego umysłu
SPINOZA AND KANT ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN MIND In the paper I try to compare the Spinozian and the Kantian accounts of the mind, underlining their relevance to contemporary debates in the area. I also discuss the problem of the nature of consciousness, in particular whether, on the basis of both Spinoza’s and Kant’s theories, one can claim that consciousness, or mentality, can be regarded as specifically distinctive of human beings. My suggestion is that one cannot. Keywords: SPINOZA, KANT, MIND, NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Wzniosłość w XVII w. na przykładzie refleksji o sztuce we Francji — Nicolasa Boileait-Despreaux recepcja traktatu Pseudo-Longinosa Peri hypsous
THE SUBLIME IN THE 17TH-CENTURY FRENCH REFLECTION ON ART—N. BOILEAU-DESPREAUX’S RECEPTION OF LONGINUS’ PERI HYPSOUS There are three basic texts on the sublime: Longinus’ Peri hypsous, Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful and Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The work of the ancient author is the most essential on this subject; it elaborates the theoretical rules of rhetoric. Because of qualitative similarity of the beautiful and the sublime, the latter was for a very long time considered a sort of beauty. Both modern texts discuss the beautiful and the sublime as opposite categories; that is new and announces romanticism with some changes in the aesthetic paradigm. The work of the seventeenth-century art theoretician, Nicolas Boileau-Despreaux, was a turning point in understanding the old category of the sublime. His French translation of the ancient treatise and his study of the seventeenth-century sublime are landmarks in modern recognition of the importance of this aesthetic idea. Boileau worked on a general theory that could be applied to various arts. That indicates a special concern for the sublime as a category that can cope with the challenge of modern art without losing the value of ancient art. Keywords: NICOLAS BOILEAU-DESPREAUX, LONGINUS, PERI HYPSOUS, THE SUBLIME
Rozważania Franciszka Suareza nad zakresem działania mocy absolutnej Boga w odniesieniu do prawa naturalnego
FRANCIS SUÁREZ’S VIEWS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD AND THE NATURAL LAW The article presents Francis Suárez’s views concerning the problem of the possibility of granting dispensation from the natural law by the absolute power of God. Suárez’s opinions on this matter were shown in his comprehensive work on the philosophy of law: De legibus ac Deo legislatore, in Book II De lege aeterna, naturali, et jure gentium, chapter XV entitled Utrum Deus dispensare possit in lege naturali etiam de absoluta potestate. Analyzing the notion of natural law Suárez accepts the Thomistic formula, according to which, the created world is a collection of things with invariable natures. These natures require us to fulfil certain moral obligations and to act in a proper manner. And for this reason, natural law, included in the Decalogue, is invariable and even God is not able to grant its dispensation. The commandments involve an intrinsic principle of justice and obligation and for this reason they are not liable to dispensation. God cannot act contrary to His own nature and His being just, so He would not order people to do something intrinsically unjust. Doctor Eximius justifies moral norms expressed in the Decalogue axiologically, not in a voluntaristic way, by referring to God’s will alone. Suárez criticises both strong theological voluntarism, attributed to Ockham, as well as weak theological voluntarism, attributed to John Duns Scotus. Keywords: FRANCIS SUÁREZ, ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD, NATURAL LAW