Kłopoty z Davidsonem czyli „O pojęciu schematu pojęciowego” inaczej
Abstract
Author: Godlewski Roman Piotr Title: SOME TROUBLE WITH DAVIDSON’S “ON THE VERY IDEA OF THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME” (Kłopoty z Davidsonem, czyli „O pojęciu schematu pojęciowego” inaczej)
Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2008, vol:.8, number: 2008/1, pages: 207-223 Keywords: DAVIDSON, CONCEPTUAL SCHEME, DOGMA OF EMPIRICISM, MEANING Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address):
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Abstract In his article “On the very idea of the conceptual scheme”, Davidson rejected the dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The article is hard to understand for the following reasons: 1. Davidson seems to claim that the third dogma of empiricism is independent from the first one; 2. he seems to maintain that the idea of conceptual scheme may have sense even when the notion of meaning is rejected; 3. he does not fight conceptual relativism arguing that it breaks the principle of contradiction or that incommensurable conceptual schemes cannot speak about the same; 4. he considers only the question of how to identify an alien scheme at another person but passes over the possibility that one person has a few schemes; 5. contrary to his previous statements, he says that translatability is not necessary for the concept of conceptual scheme but in return he gives a few metaphors only.
Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2008, vol:.8, number: 2008/1, pages: 207-223 Keywords: DAVIDSON, CONCEPTUAL SCHEME, DOGMA OF EMPIRICISM, MEANING Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address):
E-mail:
www:
Abstract In his article “On the very idea of the conceptual scheme”, Davidson rejected the dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The article is hard to understand for the following reasons: 1. Davidson seems to claim that the third dogma of empiricism is independent from the first one; 2. he seems to maintain that the idea of conceptual scheme may have sense even when the notion of meaning is rejected; 3. he does not fight conceptual relativism arguing that it breaks the principle of contradiction or that incommensurable conceptual schemes cannot speak about the same; 4. he considers only the question of how to identify an alien scheme at another person but passes over the possibility that one person has a few schemes; 5. contrary to his previous statements, he says that translatability is not necessary for the concept of conceptual scheme but in return he gives a few metaphors only.
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