Wolność jako wartość dla moralnego maksimum i moralnego minimum
Abstract
Freedom as a Value for Thin and Thick Morality
Abstract
The author analyzes freedom as a fundamental moral value of the public sphere. The point of reference for such an interpretation is to be found in Michael Walzer’s concept of thin and thick morality compared to Bernard William’s differentiation of thick and thin moral concepts. In that context freedom can be related to two separate though interdependent meanings. The domain of thin morality links freedom (conceived here as liberty) to formal equity on the procedural level of law proclamation and execution. In thick morality freedom is not only the way of expressing an individual’s autonomy, but it should also be paired with diversity fostered among society in order to fully guarantee individual freedom.
Keywords: freedom, fundamental moral value, public sphere, Michael Walzer, Bernard William.
Abstract
The author analyzes freedom as a fundamental moral value of the public sphere. The point of reference for such an interpretation is to be found in Michael Walzer’s concept of thin and thick morality compared to Bernard William’s differentiation of thick and thin moral concepts. In that context freedom can be related to two separate though interdependent meanings. The domain of thin morality links freedom (conceived here as liberty) to formal equity on the procedural level of law proclamation and execution. In thick morality freedom is not only the way of expressing an individual’s autonomy, but it should also be paired with diversity fostered among society in order to fully guarantee individual freedom.
Keywords: freedom, fundamental moral value, public sphere, Michael Walzer, Bernard William.
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