Moralne intuicje według Roberta Audiego

Abstract

Robert Audi on Moral Intuitions*

The article aims to present Robert Audi’s concept of moral intuition. The concept occupies a central role in his so called New Intuitionism, a modified version of that offered by W. D. Ross. The modifications in understanding of self-evidence and principles of prima facie obligation allow Audi to avoid classical objections raised against various versions of moral intuitionism. The order of the paper is as follows: I will start by shortly presenting the problem of moral cognition, and show main features of the intuitionistic solution to the problem (main attention will be on W. D. Ross’s moral intuitionism); then, I will shortly characterize the objections raised against traditional forms of moral intuitionism of which Ross is one of the main representatives. This will allow me to show the motivations for Audis modification of intuitionism, and how his concept of moral intuitionism avoids the objections. I will wrap up with a quick look at the present stage of the debate over Audi’s solution by sketching some of main objections raised against Audi’s view and his responses.

Keywords: moral intuition, intuitionism, reflection, self-evidence, Robert Audi, William David Ross.

* I am indebted for immense help and discussion about the content of the paper to Professor Robert Audi, Professor Stanisław Judycki and an anonymous reviser of the paper.