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Abstract
Towards Adequate Theory of Belief Change
In this article we deal with the concept of a change of belief. Main theories of belief change represent it as a propositional change, i.e. the belief state is represented as a set of propositions and changes are represented as adding, contracting and contracting plus adding (revising) proposition into a set of propositions. Nevertheless, that model has a lot of defects and we point out some of them. Obviously, there are changes that cannot be represented adequately in such a way, for example conceptual ones; P. Thagard made some attempts at analysing that kind of belief changes. We present and criticize some theses of Thagard’s theory and try to determine the conditions to be fulfilled for the conceptual change to be represented more adequately
Keywords: AGM theory, belief change, coherentism, conceptual change, foundationalism.
 
In this article we deal with the concept of a change of belief. Main theories of belief change represent it as a propositional change, i.e. the belief state is represented as a set of propositions and changes are represented as adding, contracting and contracting plus adding (revising) proposition into a set of propositions. Nevertheless, that model has a lot of defects and we point out some of them. Obviously, there are changes that cannot be represented adequately in such a way, for example conceptual ones; P. Thagard made some attempts at analysing that kind of belief changes. We present and criticize some theses of Thagard’s theory and try to determine the conditions to be fulfilled for the conceptual change to be represented more adequately
Keywords: AGM theory, belief change, coherentism, conceptual change, foundationalism.
 
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